Marquette Sports Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 1 Fall

Article 7

Major Violations for the NCAA: How the NCAA
Can Apply the Dodd-Frank Act to Reform Its Own
Corporate Governance Scheme
Jason P. Rudderman

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw
Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
Repository Citation
Jason P. Rudderman, Major Violations for the NCAA: How the NCAA Can Apply the Dodd-Frank Act to Reform Its Own Corporate
Governance Scheme, 23 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 103 (2012)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol23/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

RUDDERMAN REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

12/13/2012 1:48 PM

MAJOR VIOLATIONS FOR THE NCAA: HOW
THE NCAA CAN APPLY THE DODD-FRANK
ACT TO REFORM ITS OWN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE SCHEME
JASON P. RUDDERMAN
I. INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 sent the United States and the global
economy into the worst recession in eighty years.1 Large, interconnected
financial2 and non-financial institutions were at the center of the financial
crisis. As a result, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),3 the “most sweeping changes to
the financial system since the New Deal.”4 The effect or non-effect of the
Dodd-Frank Act has been extensively analyzed for the role that it will play in
reshaping the United States’ financial institutions and reforming corporate
governance within businesses in the United States.5
 Jason P. Rudderman graduated from the Florida State University College of Law in May
2012 and completed his Masters in Business Administration at the Florida State University College of
Business in May 2011. While at Florida State, Jason served as an Article Selection Editor for the
Florida State University Law Review and was a founding board member of the Florida State Business
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1. See Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Property in Crisis, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
1607, 1607 (2010); see also Kevin T. Jackson, The Scandal Beneath the Financial Crisis: Getting a
View from a Moral-Cultural Mental Model, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 735, 741 (2010); Karl S.
Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 185 (2009–
2010). See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: DoddFrank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151
(2011).
2. See Jerome A. Madden, A Weapon of Mass Destruction Strikes: Credit Default Swaps Bring
Down AIG and Lehman Brothers, 5 BUS L. BRIEF (2008) (describing the financial condition of AIG,
Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns and their effect on counterparties before and during the financial
crisis).
3. See generally Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
4. Jennifer Liberto, Wall Street Reform Ready for Final Votes, CNN MONEY (June 25, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/06/25/news/economy/Wall_Street_Reform/index.htm.
5. See generally, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate
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This Article, however, applies the Dodd-Frank Act, and specifically its
corporate governance laws, to the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA).6 The NCAA has experienced rapid, largely uncontrolled growth
over the past decade7 that has led to an influx of corporate governance and
regulatory problems within its member institutions.8 Since 2004, the median
total revenue for Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) schools has increased from
$28.21 million to $48.30 million.9 The largest NCAA athletic institutions
drove the vast majority of that growth, and the gap in revenue between the
richest and the poorest member institutions is widening. 10 As with financial
institutions, the influx of money itself is not the inherent problem. Money in
college athletics is good. When large schools succeed, they help support
smaller schools in their conference through revenue sharing plans.11 It is the
lack of control and governance mechanisms regulating the influx of money
that poses the risk. Money flowing from the public to athletic associations or
NCAA member institutions helps drive the NCAA. But, when money flows
from the public, or even from institutions, to student-athletes in an
impermissible manner,12 the NCAA slips toward the kind of professionalism
that will ultimately cause severe damage to the member institutions and the

Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011); Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance
Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309 (2011); Gordon & Muller, supra note 1; Frank A.
Mayer, III, Pricing Risk: Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act Orderly Liquidation Authority, PEPPER
HAMILTON LLP (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications_update.aspx?ArticleKey=1
980.
6. See generally, David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, The NCAA Adopts “Dodd-Frank”: A Fable,
STANFORD GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS. CLOSER LOOK SERIES: TOPICS, ISSUES & CONTROVERSIES IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NO. CGRP-20 (2011).
7. See generally NCAA, Revenues and Expenses 2004–2010 (2011), available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4237-2004-2010-revenues-and-expenses.aspx.
8. See Maureen A. Weston, NCAA Sanctions: Assigning Blame Where it Belongs, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 551, 551 (2011) (arguing that the NCAA’s sanctions reach is overly limited, in that “they extend
only to member institutions, not to individual coaches, players, agents, boosters, or other involved
individuals. The sanctions are [also too] broad in that they negatively impact current student-athletes,
who are restricted in their ability to transfer without penalty.”) The article proposes holding head
coaches financially accountable for program violations, forcing member institutions to disgorge
winnings and suffer financial consequences, and forcing the NCAA to cooperate with professional
leagues on player-agent issues).
9. NCAA, supra note 7, at 17.
10. Christopher Schnaars et al., USA Today Sports’ College Athletics Finances, USA TODAY,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-05-14/ncaa-college-athletics-finances-data
base/54955804/1 (last updated May 16, 2012).
11. Associated Press, Big 12 Schools Approve Revenue Share, NCAA (Oct. 3, 2011),
http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2011-10-03/big-12-schools-approve-revenue-share.
12. See 2011–12 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL §§ 12.01–12.6, 14.01–14.12 [hereinafter NCAA
BYLAWS].
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NCAA as a whole.13
As more money flows into the NCAA, its member institutions, and its
corporate leaders, new opportunities for exploitation and profits arise. Over
the past few years, the NCAA has struggled as agents and boosters began to
play an increasingly significant but undesirable role in the athletic programs of
NCAA member institutions. Cheating amongst players, coaches, and
administrators is rampant.14 The NCAA, like the financial industry, is
experiencing a period of rapid growth, inconsistent (or a total lack of)
enforceable regulation, and a tremendous influx of “foreign” variables into its
system. Much like the structured finance mortgage-backed securities (MBSs)
and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that eventually brought down the
financial system in the United States, the influx of agents, booster control, and
extreme profits within NCAA member institutions threatens the amateur status
and ultimate viability of the NCAA and its member institutions.
The NCAA is also experiencing a moral hazard problem. In the financial
sector, the idea of government bailouts creates moral hazard problems by
effectively insuring large financial institutions.15 “[T]he notion of ‘too big to
fail’ creates a race to the bottom, whereby institutions attempt to grow faster
than regulators can regulate in order to force themselves into the category of
‘too big to fail’ to implicate the inherent [sic] insurance scheme.”16 The
NCAA is experiencing a similar phenomenon, as the largest institutions
understand that they bring significant value to the NCAA and that the NCAA
will be hesitant to levy harsh penalties with severe financial consequences on
large institutions because of the consequences such penalties would have on
the rest of the NCAA.17
The NCAA, however, has the opportunity to avoid the fate of the financial
industry by adopting modified provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act to reform
corporate governance both within NCAA corporate headquarters and member
institutions. More stringent regulation of coaches, boosters, and agents;

13. See Philip D. Bartz & Nicholas S. Sloey, The Joy of College Sports: Why the NCAA’s
Efforts to Preserve Amateurism Are Both Lawful and in the Best Interest of College Athletics, BRYAN
CAVE BULLS., at 2 (Dec. 13, 2011), available at http://www.bryancave.com/files/Publication/d1b731c
5-7f86-4347-a032-64b2049dae12/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1ee1ad19-d6cb-4ce4-8f02-66a
e12ce1c6b/The%20Joy%20of%20College%20Sports%20-%20Article_v2.pdf.
14. See id. at 1.
15. Jason Rudderman, Eliminating Wall Street’s Safety Net: How a Systemic Risk Premium
Can Solve “Too Big to Fail”, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 39, 53 (2012).
16. Id.
17. See Michael Rosenberg, Why NCAA Couldn’t, and Wouldn’t, Give Miami the Death
Penalty, SI.COM (Aug. 18, 2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/michael_rosenberg/08/
18/miami.deathpenalty/index.html.
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harsher penalties for violation of those regulations; and consistent enforcement
of such penalties will help curb the impermissible behavior of the NCAA’s
member institutions.18
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the goals of the NCAA and
identifies the harms being imposed as a result of the current regulatory regime.
Part III of this Article explores the similar market trajectories of the United
States financial sector and the NCAA. Part IV highlights the need for
corporate governance reform. Part V explores how many of the corporate
governance reforms in the Dodd-Frank Act can solve the problems in NCAA
corporate governance. The purpose of Part V is not to explore the many
arguable flaws in the Dodd-Frank Act as it applies to governance in the
financial sector, but to explore its novel application to solving the much less
complicated, but equally present, corporate governance issues in collegiate
athletics. Part VI concludes.
II. WHY THE LACK OF WORKABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
PUNISHMENT MECHANISMS HARMS STUDENT-ATHLETES, UNIVERSITIES, AND
THE NCAA AS A WHOLE
NCAA president Mark Emmert says that the NCAA should remain an
institution focused on bettering the academic experience of student-athletes
through collegiate athletics, and not on acting as a conduit for professional
athletics, or as a professional athletic institution.19 The dangerous trek
towards professionalism, de-amateurization, and corporate governance chaos
could produce widespread harm for students, universities, and the ultimate
consumer. As Bartz and Sloey discuss, “[t]urning college sports into a pure
business—as the critics effectively urge—will not fix the problems” of
18. See Jon Saraceno, NFL’s Big Hit: Saints Lose Their Head Coach, Draft Picks and Much
More, USA TODAY, Mar. 22, 2012, at 1A (noting that as a result of the Saint’s illegal bounty program
designed to injure opposing players, the National Football League (NFL) levied the harshest penalty
in league history by, among other actions, suspending the head coach for one year.) The NFL clearly
sent a signal to the rest of the league that this kind of behavior will not be tolerated and that no team is
above the law of the league. The NCAA could benefit from sending a similar signal, when the time
arises.
19. Office of the President: On the Mark, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/
public/NCAA/NCAA+President/On+the+Mark (last updated Oct. 5, 2010). On the collegiate model
of athletics, President Emmert, referring to the NCAA as a whole, said that:
We must be student-centered in all that we do. The Association was founded on the
notion of integrating athletics into the educational experience, and we have to make sure
we deliver on that 100-year-old promise. We have to remind ourselves that this is about
the young men and women we asked to come to our schools for a great educational
experience.

Id.
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scandals and rule violations in college sports.20 Certain restrictions on
eligibility requirements are necessary to preserve the unique product of college
sports.21
The NCAA must continue to enforce its bylaws and regulations in order to
preserve the uniqueness of its product. The NCAA’s academic standards, for
example, are a mechanism for the NCAA to prevent member institutions from
competing for recruits on the basis of decreased academic requirements.22
Similarly, the NCAA’s amateurism requirements that restrict pay and other
benefits to college athletes are also necessary to preserve the product.23
Eliminating these requirements “would almost certainly negatively impact the
attractiveness of college [sports].”24
Professionalizing college sports would make a select few institutions
better off but would harm the vast majority of schools.25 While most schools
operate football and basketball at a profit, when combined with the nonrevenue generating men’s and women’s sports, only twenty-two NCAA
member institutions made a profit in 2010.26 A lack of regulation and
consistency in governance by the NCAA, at the margin, will effectively
eliminate most college athletic programs.27 The biggest, most profitable
athletic programs will survive simply because they have the resources to entice
athletes to attend their institutions.28 If an NCAA consisting of 120 Division I
member institutions is more desirable than one of 10 to 15, then it is necessary
to enforce consistent, accountable regulation and governance upon the NCAA.
Free market proponents will argue that if market forces dictate the
elimination of athletic programs at most NCAA institutions, then the market
should be allowed to dictate the structure of the NCAA and pay studentathletes, by way of a salary above and beyond the value of their scholarship,
for their services. But, remember that the goal of the NCAA should not be
profit maximization—it should be fostering the advancement of academics at

20. Bartz & Sloey, supra note 13, at 2 (noting that allowing professionalism into college sports
would actually harm the NCAA and its member institutions).
21. See id. at 16–17 (discussing that the “unique quality of the athletes is that they are college
students who are also amateurs. Those unique qualities are what make NCAA sports so popular.”).
22. See id. at 17–18.
23. See id. at 19.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 24–25.
26. Libby Sander, 22 Elite College Sports Programs Turned a Profit in 2010, but Gaps
Remain,
NCAA
Reports
Says,
CHRON.
HIGHER
EDUC.
(June
15,
2011),
http://chronicle.com/article/22-Elite-College-Sports/127921/.
27. See Bartz & Sloey, supra note 13, at 24–29.
28. See id. at 24.
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the highest level through athletics.
The NCAA and its member institutions, much like the country’s largest
financial institutions, are quickly losing sight of long-term objectives in
exchange for short-term profits.29 For example, the head basketball coach at
the University of Kentucky received $350,000 for winning the national title
this year but had just $50,000 in incentives tied to the graduation rate for his
players.30 There is an inherent problem in the fact that member institutions
sanction such bonus structures but provide no real economic or moral
incentive for a coach to invest in his or her student-athletes’ chances at
graduation.
Over the past decade, the NCAA has slowly shifted from a focus on
amateurism and bettering the educational experience of the student-athlete31 to
focusing on commercialism and profiting from collegiate sports.32 It is
imperative that the NCAA adopt and enforce new regulations to rectify its
corporate governance issues and return the NCAA to a forum for healthy
amateur competition.
III. THE SIMILAR MARKET TRAJECTORIES OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL SECTOR
AND THE NCAA
A. The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Financial Sector
The financial crisis began with a decade of a capital influx into the United
States.33 The newfound capital made raising and borrowing money easy and
decreased rates on safe investments such as T-bills, leading to a decline in
long-term interest rates.34 The easy money led financial institutions to become

29. See generally Associated Press, Final Four Coaches Collect Bonuses, ESPN (Mar. 27,
2012), http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/2012/story/_/id/7744519/final-fourcoaches-john-calipari-thad-matta-rick-pitino-bill-self-poised-keep-cashing-in.
30. Id.
31. See Where Does the Money Go?: Eye on the Money, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/
wcm/connect/public/ncaa/answers/eye+on+the+money (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) (stating that the
NCAA’s core purpose is “to govern competition in a fair, safe, equitable and sportsmanlike manner
and to integrate intercollegiate athletics into higher education so that the educational experience of the
student-athlete is paramount”).
32. See Michael J. Critelli, The Good, Bad and Ugly About the Commercialization of Amateur
Sports, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-jcritelli/amateur-sports_b_844686.html.
33. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman. Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Morehouse College: Four
Questions About the Financial Crisis (Apr. 14, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090414a.htm).
34. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Bundesbank Lecture, Berlin,
Germany: Global Imbalances: Recent Developments and Prospects (Sept. 11, 2007) (transcript
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highly leveraged,35 using hard-to-value assets like CDOs and MBSs as
collateral for loans.36
Meanwhile, Wall Street investors noticed a consistent housing price
increase from 1997 through 2005, and investors, borrowers, and lenders
viewed real estate as the one investment that could never decline in value.37
Wall Street viewed securitizing subprime loans as a way to diversify risk.38
Investment banks purchased mortgages from a variety of originators and
downstream bankers.39 The investment banks bought thousands of these
mortgages and pooled them together based on factors like the creditworthiness
of the borrower and the loan-to-value ratio of the home.40 Once the mortgages
were pooled together based on these factors, the large pool of similar
mortgages was split up into thousands of little slices and sold to investors as
MBSs.41 The slice gives the investor the right to his or her fair share of the
payment stream from the larger pool of mortgages.42 These assets, however,
were built on the assumption that housing markets would never decline.43
When the housing market collapsed, these assets became almost
impossible to value.44 As foreclosed homes went up for sale by the thousands,
neighboring homes also lost value because potential buyers were wary of

available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070911a.htm).
35. See Roger Lowenstein, Smart Banks with Dumb Customers Don’t Exist, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 7, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-03-07/smart-banks-with-dumb-customersdon-t-exist-roger-lowenstein.html (arguing that “there is no such thing as a smart bank with a dumb
customer; if the loan turns sour, the banker was dumb, too.”); MARIO ONORATO & GABRIELLA
SYMEONIDOU, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: BUSINESS
MODEL IMPLICATIONS 18 (2011) (noting that “leverage allows a financial institution to increase the
potential gains or losses on a[n] . . . investment beyond what would be possible . . . [with its] own
funds.”); see also, Satyajit Chatterjee, De-Leveraging and the Financial Accelerator: How Wall
Street Can Shock Main Street, PHILA. FED. BUS. REV., Summer 2010, at 1, 2.
36. See Bengt Holmstrom, Discussion of “the Panic of 2007,” by Gary Gorton, MIT
ECONOMICS (Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://economics.mit.edu/files/3784 (book review) (noting
that as the subprime market began to collapse, the MBSs and CDOs became unable to serve as
collateral for loans).
37. See World News with Charles Gibson: Housing Troubles; Boom or Bust (ABC television
broadcast Apr. 8, 2008) (transcript on file with law review).
38. See Gretchen Morgenson, Housing Policy’s Third Rail, N.Y. TIMES, Aug 8, 2010, at BU1.
39.
James Kwak, Financial Crisis for Beginners, THE BASELINE SCENARIO,
http://baselinescenario.com/financial-crisis-for-beginners/#securitization (last visited Oct. 25, 2012).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. Danielle DiMartino & John V. Duca, The Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages, 2 ECON.
LETTER: INSIGHTS FROM THE FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., Nov. 2007, at 1, 3–4.
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buying a home in a neighborhood with lots of other foreclosures.45 Without
home price appreciation, the homeowners who entered into complex
adjustable mortgages during the housing boom found themselves underwater
on their mortgages.46 Investment bankers who leveraged millions of dollars to
purchase mortgages were stuck with homes or payment rights they could no
longer sell. The damaged housing market led to frozen credit markets, as
financial institutions were left holding billions of dollars of worthless
mortgages.47
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy while
holding billions of dollars worth of MBSs and caused widespread investor and
market panic.48
B. The Similar Rise of the NCAA
While a lack of corporate governance in the NCAA does not carry the
same systemic threat as the financial markets discussed above, a total failure
of the NCAA and, as a result, professional sports, would have large-scale
consequences on the United States’ economy.49 The revenue numbers in the
NCAA since 2004 are staggering.50 Median total revenue of NCAA
institutions has increased by over 71% during the six years from 2004 to
2010.51 By comparison, for the seven years prior to the peak of the housing
bubble in early 2007, the average home price in the United States increased by
approximately 36.8%.52
Much like the United States economy, the financial gap between the
richest and poorest NCAA member institutions is increasing.53 The
University of Texas, the NCAA’s highest revenue generator, earned

45. Id. at 5.
46. Id.
47. Bernanke, supra note 33.
48. Jenny Anderson & Eric Dash, For Lehman, More Cuts and Anxiety, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
2008, at C1 (noting that Lehman Brothers incurred losses of $2.8 billion during the second quarter of
2008).
49. See Chris Isidore, College Football’s $1.1 Billion Profit, CNN MONEY (Dec. 29, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/12/29/news/companies/college_football_dollars/index.htm (noting that
NCAA football profits topped $1 billion dollars in 2010).
50. See NCAA, supra note 7, at 17.
51. See id.
52. Reggie Middleton, The Global Housing Bubble: It’s a Small World After All, SEEKING
ALPHA (Mar. 5, 2009), http://seekingalpha.com/article/124306-the-global-housing-bubble-it-s-asmall-world-after-all.
53. See Schnaars, supra note 10.
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$150,295,926 from 2006 to 2011.54 By contrast, the University of North
Texas, the lowest revenue generator of the 120 NCAA FBS teams, generated
just $11,259,222.55 The University of Alabama’s athletic department had the
highest profit in 2010 ($31,684,872), while 72 of the 120 other Division I
athletic departments failed to return a profit.56 Meanwhile, the cost of tuition
is rising across the board and, even for full scholarship athletes, attending
college is becoming an expensive proposition.57 The market trajectories of the
United States economy from 2000 to 2007 and the NCAA from 2004 to
present are eerily similar. Both experienced an enormous increase in revenue
and capital influx and struggled to create meaningful, workable, and consistent
regulatory regimes to control and manage the growth. Without meaningful
corporate governance reform, the NCAA is bound to collapse as schools are
driven toward competing for athletes, not fans, in a market driven by player
compensation, rather than by academic and athletic opportunity.58
IV. THE CASE FOR REFORM OF THE NCAA RULEBOOK AND COMPLIANCE
MANUAL
The NCAA Constitution states that the NCAA’s purpose “is to maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the
athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear
line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports.”59 However, there has been widespread criticism of the NCAA and its
regulatory framework for “[not] paying student athletes, limiting pay for
coaches, measuring academic eligibility requirements in the form of
standardized testing and high school curriculum, and using amateurism as a
guise for commercialism in college sports.”60 The tilt towards a commercial
focus for the NCAA has also permeated the NCAA’s member institutions and
promoted a win at all costs mentality. Among the NCAA schools that have

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Alicia Jessop, Highest Net Income Amongst Athletic Departments, THE BUS. OF COLL.
SPORTS (Mar. 21, 2012), http://businessofcollegesports.com/2012/03/21/highest-net-incomeamongst-athletics-departments/ (noting that, like much of the financial sector prior to the collapse, the
rich are getting richer in college football).
57. NCPA Scholarship Shortfall Search: NCAA Forces College Athletes to Pay, NAT’L.
COLL. PLAYERS ASS’N., http://www.ncpanow.org/research?id=0018 (last visited Oct. 25, 2012)
(noting that the out-of-pocket cost to a full scholarship college athlete can range from $200 to
$10,962 per year).
58. Bartz & Sloey, supra note 13, at 17–18.
59. NCAA BYLAWS § 1.3.1 (2011–12).
60. Weston, supra note 8, at 562.
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won a football national championship since 1936, all but Brigham Young
University have had a major violation in football.61 A major violation is
defined as one that ‘“usually provide[s] an extensive recruiting or competitive
advantage’ that ‘can lead to significant penalties against the school and
involved individuals.’”62 Almost half of the Division I NCAA member
institutions have had a major violation in football since 1987, and over 80% of
those are from the so-called Bowl Championship Series (BCS) conferences.63
Since 1987, the Southeastern Conference has won ten national titles in
football, more than any other conference.64 During that same timeframe, the
Southeastern Conference had thirteen major football violations, also more than
any other conference.65 The numbers raise the question: Is it possible to win
in college football without cheating, and if not, why has the NCAA not made
it impossible to win again after cheating? The ‘“social acceptance of cheating
has gotten ridiculous . . . . [It is] only a problem if you get caught. There does
not seem to be the moral shame that there once was.’”66
One of the main problems with corporate governance inside financial
institutions, and the promulgated regulations outside the organizations, is the
one-time reputational game many managers were playing. For example, a
manager has two options: behave honestly, truthfully, and ethically or behave
in a self-interested, profit-maximizing manner. Where these options are
aligned, and the honest, truthful, ethical behavior is also the profit-maximizing
behavior, then many problems of corporate governance disappear. Where,
however, as was the case in the financial sector, the profit maximizing
behavior is not the honest, truthful, ethical, and fair behavior, managers begin
to play a different game. Now, managers begin by asking: Why am I pursuing

61. See Dennis Dodd, Championships Without Cheating? History is Against it, CBS
SPORTS.COM (July 6, 2011), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/15298370/championsh
ips-without-cheating-maybe-doable-but-history-against-it (noting that even the schools without major
violations “aren’t necessarily crowing over that fact, more like crossing their fingers”).
62. Brett McMurphy, Major NCAA Violations Yield Relatively Minor Consequences, CBS
SPORTS.COM (July 11, 2011), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/15312728/major-ncaaviolations-yield-relatively-minor-consequences
(quoting
Glossary
of
Terms,
NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Enforcement/Resources/Glossary (last updated
Mar. 21, 2011)). Major violations include repeated impermissible contact with recruits and delivering
impermissible benefits to players.
63. See Dodd, supra note 61.
64. See Past FBS Champions, CBS SPORTS.COM, http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball
/story/2554072 (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
65. Brett McMurphy, Infractions Scoreboard: Nearly Everybody Gets in on the Fun, CBS
SPORTS.COM (July 8, 2011), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/15304779/infractionsscoreboard-nearly-everybody-gets-in-on-the-fun.
66. See Dodd, supra note 61 (quoting Marc Ganis, president of SportsCorp).
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the course or career I am pursuing? Is it for personal fulfillment or financial
gain? Again, where it is for personal fulfillment, the inquiry stops and the
manager likely behaves ethically. Where it is for financial gain, the inquiry
continues. Now, the manager asks a final question: Do the financial rewards I
can gain from behaving unethically outweigh the reputational hit I will take as
a result of this behavior? If the costs to the manager’s reputation outweigh the
financial reward, the inquiry ends again, and the manager behaves ethically.
Where the financial gain outweighs the reputational hit to the manager, the
manager behaves unethically.
From a coaching and player perspective, the inquiry is much the same.
The coach, for example, asks whether he should behave in the honest, ethical,
rule-abiding manner or in the “win” maximizing manner.67 Where those two
outcomes are the same, the inquiry ends. Where they differ, the coach asks:
Why am I pursuing the course I am pursuing? If it is because of the ultimate
desire to win at all costs, the coach cheats. If it is because the coach wants to
be a role model for the young men and women he mentors, then he behaves
ethically and the inquiry ends. If the coach decides he wants to win at all
costs, the coach asks: Do the prospective gains from cheating outweigh the
costs to my reputation if I am caught? Where the gains outweigh the costs, the
coach cheats.68

67. Evidence of this behavior is derived from the coaches who knowingly take action that
violates a NCAA rule in order to try to gain a competitive advantage on the field. See Associated
Press,
Arizona
St.
Postseason
Ban
Upheld,
ESPN
(Nov.
4,
2011),
http://espn.go.com/espn/story/_/id/7189349/ncaa-upholds-postseason-ban-arizona-state-sun-devilsbaseball (discussing a postseason ban and vacation of wins for the Arizona State baseball team after it
was found the head coach failed to promote an atmosphere of compliance and committed a number of
recruiting violations) (hereinafter Arizona St. Postseason Ban Upheld); Associated Press, NCAA Puts
Radford on 2-Year Probation, ESPN (Feb. 24, 2012), http://espn.go.com/collegesports/story/_/id/7612521/ncaa-punishes-radford-highlanders-sanctions-brad-greenberg (hereinafter
NCAA Puts Radford on 2-Year Probation) (stating that Radford basketball coaches provided
impermissible transportation and lodging benefits to recruits); Boise State Cited for Major Violations,
NCAA (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2011-09-13/boise-state-cited-majorviolations (noting that Boise State, in addition to multiple recruiting violations, provided
impermissible lodging, transportation, practice sessions, financial aid, and cash payments to players
and recruits); Bruce Pearl Told Recruits of Violation, ESPN (Oct. 22, 2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=5714649 (stating that Bruce Pearl, the former men’s
basketball coach at Tennessee, hosted a BBQ for recruits at his home and told the recruits and their
families that “their visit equated to an NCAA violation”); NCAA Accepts Baylor’s Penalties, ESPN
(Apr. 12, 2012), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7801565/ncaa-puts-baylor-bearsprobation-accepts-self-imposed-penalties-text-messages (noting that Baylor was placed on three
years’ probation after coaches made hundreds of impermissible phone calls and text messages to
recruits).
68. In all the above scenarios, it is safe to say that coaches committed these recruiting
violations because they believed that the gains to be had from signing a key recruit outweighed the
risk of the violation. See generally Arizona St. Postseason Ban Upheld, supra note 67; NCAA Puts
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In the financial sector, when a manager decides to pursue financial gain at
the expense of a reputational hit, the violation is often incredibly damaging
and the consequences are made exceedingly public.69 However, the golden
parachutes present in many executive compensation packages are often so
substantial that any public hit to reputation, if there is one, is minimal in
comparison.70 In college athletics, however, the financial reward from
cheating is substantially greater than the cost to a coach’s, player’s, or
administrator’s reputation because of the lack of consistently enforceable
punishment mechanisms in the NCAA.71 NCAA President Mark Emmert
acknowledged the reputational problem and recently proposed revised
punishment guidelines for NCAA member institutions to deal with the issue.72
Emmert emphasized the need for ‘“some sort of constructive fear’” in NCAA
member institutions.73 The NCAA’s Vice President for Enforcement also
remarked that the NCAA needs a fair penalty structure but also one that is
strong and predictable.74 Member institutions acknowledge that scholarship
reductions, postseason bans, and coaching suspensions have the greatest
deterrence effect and do the most to eliminate the advantages gained from an
infraction.75 However, the NCAA has been more apt in recent years to shy
away from using its harshest penalties.76
Although the NCAA is taking steps to restructure its enforcement team for
more effective regulation,77 the current ‘“reward [of cheating] outweighs the
Radford on 2-Year Probation, supra note 67; Boise Stat Cited for Major Violations, supra note 67;
Bruce Pearl Told Recruits of Violation, supra note 67; NCAA Accepts Baylor’s Penalties, supra note
67.
69. See, e.g., Michael Rothfeld, The Madoff Fraud: Madoff Investors Brace for Lawsuits,
WALL ST. J., July 26, 2010, at C1 (representing just one article as part of an entire online section
dedicated to the Madoff scandal).
70. See Steven M. Davidoff, Out of the Ruins: Where Directors Landed, DEALBOOK (Aug. 2,
2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/out-of-the-ruins-where-directors-landed/ (showing
that oftentimes, managers take extreme risk with very little downside).
71. Dodd, supra note 61 (“The near-death penalty handed to USC might have been a good
place for the NCAA to start cleaning up [their regulatory regime]. . . . But the college world is
waiting to see if the NCAA infractions committee is going to keep the momentum going [in future
punishments].”).
72. Steve Wieberg, NCAA Proposal Would Ratchet up Penalties, USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-02-09/ncaas-emmert-backs-tough-enforcementchanges/53033832/1 (last updated Feb. 12, 2012).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. NCAA Enforcement Restructures for Greater Flexibility, NCAA (June 30, 2011),
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/2011/june/ncaa+enforceme
nt+restructures+for+greater+flexibility.
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risk.’”78 What fans want, and what the NCAA needs, is a more court-like
proceeding—one where “cases . . . are processed quickly and similar penalties
[are handed down] for similar violations.”79 The consequences for violations
in the NCAA are so minor that Alabama and Louisiana State University (LSU)
could still compete for the national title in 2011 even though they were both
on probation.80 Of the seventy-two major NCAA violations handed down
since 1987, thirty teams had a higher winning percentage for the five-year
period after the penalties were levied than they did during the five years
before.81 Cheating by NCAA member institutions obviously provides a longterm benefit to its offenders. That benefit, as evidenced by the fact that many
teams actually win more frequently after a penalty is levied than they do prior
to the penalty, also indicates that the consequences for cheating do little to
eliminate the competitive advantage gained by the cheating institution.
V. WHERE THE NCAA STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE ALIGN WITH THE
FINANCIAL SECTOR, AND HOW THE DODD-FRANK ACT CAN HELP RESOLVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS IN THE NCAA
With the regulatory inconsistencies and recent historical contexts in mind,
this Article now turns to the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that deal with
corporate governance in financial institutions and, with some modifications,
are equally applicable to the NCAA.
A. Too Big to Fail82
B. Executive compensation
a. Section 951: requiring shareholder votes on executive
compensation.83
b. Section 953: requiring executive compensation
disclosure.84
c. Section 954: requiring executives to return compensation

78. Dodd, supra note 61 (quoting David Ridpath, an NCAA compliance expert).
79. Id.
80. See generally NCAA, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, TUSCALOOSA PUBLIC INFRACTIONS
REPORT (2009); NCAA, LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT (2011).
81. McMurphy, supra note 62. But note, probation is a necessary, but it is only a part of the
story. There are a number of variables that affect the winning percentage of programs after a major
violation. One reason for the increased winning percentage is the change in coaching staff that results
after a major violation occurs. Programs actually benefit from the violation, as they get a fresh start
with a new coach.
82. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, at preamble (2010).
83. Id. § 951.
84. Id. § 953.

RUDDERMAN REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

116

12/13/2012 1:48 PM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1

in certain circumstances.85
C. Regulatory consistency, comparability, and transparency
a. Section 712: requiring consultation by broker dealers with
the Commodities Futures Trade Commission (CFTC) or
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) before making a
trade in order to assure regulator consistency,
comparability, and transparency.86
D. Independent committees
a. Section 932: providing for an independent board of
directors.87
E. Whistleblower protections
a. Section 1014: providing for the consumer advisory
board.88
A. “Too Big to Fail”
The opening paragraph of the Dodd-Frank Act states that the purpose of
the Act is to “promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’,
to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers
from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”89 Similarly,
the opening paragraph of the NCAA Rulebook on Enforcement states, “It shall
be the mission of the NCAA enforcement program to eliminate violations of
NCAA rules and impose appropriate penalties should violations occur.”90
During the financial crisis, Congress learned quickly that inconsistent
treatment of the largest financial institutions would create significant backlash
from the public and private sectors and create confusion in the markets.91

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. § 954.
Id. § 712.
Id. § 932.
Id. § 1014.
Id. at preamble.
NCAA BYLAWS § 19.01.1 (2011–12). The regulation continues,
The program is committed to fairness of procedures and the timely and equitable
resolution of infractions cases. The achievement of these objectives is essential to the
conduct of a viable and effective enforcement program. Further, an important
consideration in imposing penalties is to provide fairness to uninvolved student-athletes,
coaches, administrators, competitors and other institutions.

Id.
91. See generally Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Contagion, 108 J. POL. ECON. 1
(2000).
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Title 1 of the Dodd-Frank Act creates the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC) to “monitor emerging risks to U. S. financial stability” and to
identify and recommend for monitoring those financial and non-financial
institutions that pose a systemic risk to the United States financial system.92
However, knowing the regulatory framework that is in place, large institutions,
as part of their growth plan, will consider the likely response of the
government should the institution fail. The institution knows that the
government will likely find that the cost of saving a single “too big to fail”
institution is outweighed by the cost to the overall economy should that
institution be allowed to fail.
Thus, in a one-time game, the institution has every incentive
to take great risk to ensure that [the damage the institution
would do should it fail is so great that] the government will
[essentially have no choice but to] bail out the institution . . . .
However, the government is involved in a longer-term game,
and while it may be rational for the government to bail out a
financial institution in one period, it may not be rational for
the government to send a signal to other institutions, by way
of a bailout, that they are able and willing to bail out a failing
institution in a future period.93
The NCAA has found itself wrapped up in a similar game, whereby
institutions like Ohio State University and the University of Texas, and
conferences like the Southeastern Conference and the Pac 12, have essentially
been tagged “too big to fail.” These institutions and conferences have
positioned themselves so that their “failure,” by way of cheating, and
equivalent severe punishment by the NCAA, would have such devastating
effects on the school’s conference and the NCAA that levying serious
sanctions on the school would be equivalent to allowing, as the government
did, Lehman Brothers to fail.94 Lehman Brothers, while operating, helped
support the United States credit market by issuing loans, receiving loans, and
using asset-backed securities as collateral in both instances.95 By analogy,
most major conferences have revenue sharing plans, whereby the largest, most
profitable, “too big to fail” athletic programs in each conference help support
92. The Restoring of American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. Rep. 111-176, at 2.
93. Rudderman, supra note 15, at 49–50.
94. See Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of England, Speech at the Financial
Student Association, Amsterdam: Rethinking the Financial Network 2 (Apr. 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2009/speech386.pdf).
Haldane compares the contagion effect of the financial crisis to the SARS outbreak, highlighting the
gross overreaction of the masses that led to the ultimate collapse of a system.
95. See id.
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the lower revenue generating schools.96 As discussed, large financial
institutions will ensure that they become so large that the government will be
forced to bail them out to avoid a total systemic collapse of the economy.
NCAA member institutions do not have the same tools at their disposal to
rapidly scale their size and profitability. Instead, and what has happened over
recent years, the NCAA has levied lesser penalties on larger institutions for
similar violations because of what the larger institutions mean to the
profitability and viability of conferences and the NCAA.97 Large member
institutions now have an incentive to “bend” the rules as much as possible
without being subject to serious penalties (the threshold of which is much
higher than with smaller member institutions), and in turn, the NCAA has an
incentive to levy harsh penalties on small, low revenue generating institutions
in an inadequate attempt to signal to NCAA member institutions that
violations will not be tolerated.98
As with financial institutions, however, the regulatory scheme to solve
“too big to fail” cannot be a hands-off approach that allows every systemically
important but struggling institution to fail. And it cannot be a system of pure
ex-ante regulations because the ingenuity of the financial markets, and the
NCAA, will simply perpetuate a race to the bottom.99
The NCAA cannot levy crippling penalties on its largest, most profitable
schools because of the systemic impact it would have on the NCAA and its
member institutions, nor can it regulate away all violations of NCAA rules
through ex-ante regulations. What the NCAA can do, however, is adopt the
system of ex-ante regulations proposed below and develop a framework for
punishment that is consistently decided based on the nature of the violations
and not the size, scale, profitability, or history of the member institution.

96. Associated Press, supra note 11.
97. See Bill N., Auburn’s Cam Newton Got a Day and USC Trojans’ Football Got BushWhacked by NCAA, BLEACHER REPORT (Dec. 1, 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/532046-uscfootball-auburns-cam-newton-got-a-day-and-the-trojans-got-bushwhacked (noting that it makes a big
difference playing in the SEC, as Auburn received a slap on the wrist for its potential pay-for-play
scheme, and USC received severe punishment in a case where the NCAA had little proof of
knowledge on the part of the institution).
98. Compare Rosenberg, supra note 17 (noting that Miami “means” too much to college
football for the NCAA to levy severe penalties commensurate with the violations. A Miami booster
provided upwards of seventy players with cash, benefits, parties, and adult entertainment), with NCAA
Puts Radford on 2-Year Probation, supra note 67 (discussing severe penalties for Radford’s
basketball program resulting from relatively minor lodging and transportation violations).
99. Rudderman, supra note 15, at 53.
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B. Sections 951, 953, 954 and How These Compensatory Regulations Can Be
Applied to Players and Coaches
In the years leading up to the financial crisis, executive compensation
ballooned largely out of control. As a result, Congress enacted sections 951,
953, and 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act.100 Section 951 provides that at least
once every three years, executive compensation shall be subject to a
shareholder vote.101 At least once every six years, shareholders shall vote to
determine whether to vote on executive compensation every one, two, or three
years.102 However, the SEC may exempt small issuers from the voting
requirements if it “disproportionally burdens” the issuer.103
Section 953 requires disclosure to shareholders of executive compensation
schemes, as well as information showing “the relationship between executive
compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the issuer, taking
into account any change in the value of the shares of stock and dividends of
the issuer and any distributions.”104 The section also requires that the issuer
disclose the median of the annual total compensation of all employees of the
issuer, except the chief executive officer.105
Section 954 requires that:
In the event that the issuer is required to prepare an
accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of
the issuer with any financial reporting requirement under the
securities laws, the issuer will recover from any current or
former executive officer of the issuer who received incentivebased compensation (including stock options awarded as
compensation) during the 3-year period preceding the date on
which the issuer is required to prepare an accounting
restatement, based on the erroneous data, in excess of what
would have been paid to the executive officer under the
accounting restatement.106
In other words, the executive must repay the difference between what the
executive actually received and what the executive would have received if the

100. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 951, 953–54, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899, 1903–04.
(2010) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n-1, 78l, 78j-4 (2012)).
101. Id. § 951(a)(1).
102. Id. § 951(a)(2).
103. Id. § 951(e).
104. Id. § 953(a)(i).
105. Id. § 953(b)(1)(A)–(C).
106. Id. § 954(b)(2).
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financial statements were correctly reported.107
These three main executive compensation provisions of Dodd-Frank can
be implemented, in an altered form, to remedy a misalignment of incentives in
coaches’ and directors’ salaries in collegiate athletics.108 At most large
schools, the three highest profile “executives” are the head men’s basketball
coach, the head football coach, and the athletic director. They are often the
most highly compensated members of the athletic department.109 Despite their
high salaries and public figure status, the NCAA rulebook is relatively silent
on coaches’ and directors’ “executive” compensation.110
The NCAA rulebook spends just over one page discussing “executive
compensation.”111 The NCAA imposes regulations and restrictions mostly
aimed at prohibiting athletic association employees from accepting outside
supplemental pay for unspecified achievements and prohibits any outside
source from controlling the employment or compensation decisions of athletic
association employees.112 Below are three proposed amendments that should
be added to section 11.3 of the NCAA rulebook in order to align the incentives
of NCAA “executives” with the goals of the NCAA and to implement more
responsibility and accountability amongst the chief officials at member
institutions.
First, in assessing and applying the Dodd-Frank Act to the NCAA, it is
necessary to think of students, faculty, boosters, alumni, student-athletes, and
academic administrations as stakeholders of the private athletic associations
and each individual athletic association as a stakeholder of the larger NCAA
governing body. In considering the abovementioned parties as stakeholders, it
is easy to see how section 951—requiring an annual, bi-annual, or tri-annual
vote by shareholders on executive compensation, and requiring a vote at least

107. Id.
108. See generally Arizona St. Postseason Ban Upheld, supra note 67; NCAA Puts Radford on
2-Year Probation, supra note 67; Boise State Cited for Major Violations, supra note 67; Bruce Pearl
Told Recruits of Violation, supra note 67; NCAA Accepts Baylor’s Penalties, supra note 67.
109. See Erik Brady et al., Coaches’ Pay Soars Again, USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 2011, at 1A
(hereinafter Coaches’ Pay Soars Again) (noting that the average compensation for a NCAA head
football coach in a conference with an automatic BCS bid is $2.15 million); Erik Brady et al., You
Have to Pay to Play in March, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2012, at 1A (hereinafter You Have to Pay to
Play in March) (noting the average salary for a coach in the NCAA men’s basketball tournament is
$1.4 million); Jodi Upton & Steve Berkowitz, Athletics Directors Cashing in, too, USA TODAY, Oct.
6, 2011, at 1A (noting that one out of every twelve athletic directors makes more than $900,000).
110. See NCAA BYLAWS §§ 11.2–11.3 (2011–12).
111. See id.
112. Id. However, the NCAA rulebook’s restrictions on executive compensation make no
mention of how compensation is determined nor the financial consequences for executives in the
event the school is placed on probation as a result of their actions.
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once every six years on how often to vote on executive compensation—113and
section 953—requiring certain disclosures of executive and other employee
salaries—114can apply to the NCAA. Currently, NCAA member institution
“executives” are accountable either to the athletic director, in the case of a
head coach, or to the university president, in the case of an athletic director.
The university system in America is unique, however, as alumni and current
students largely power the incoming cash flow for the schools that in turn
support athletic associations.115 The corporate governance structure of
allowing such closely held evaluations by a few individuals to determine the
amount of compensation of executives and the satisfactory or non-satisfactory
nature of their performance is more akin to the present structure in a closely
held startup company, rather than a large, even private, institution. Allowing
university students, faculty, boosters, alumni, student-athletes, and academic
administrations to vote annually or bi-annually on the compensation of the top
“executives” within its athletic department will force accountability on the part
of the “executives” to university stakeholders and align “executives’” goals
with the long term goals of the university and its stakeholders.
Critics will argue that current students would not sacrifice winning now to
remove or limit the compensation of a coach committing violations, causing
damage to the long-term reputation of the school. However, at schools that are
the subject of this Article, athletics drive academics as much as academics
drive athletics.116 Athletic success on the field drives up applications and
institutional ranking in the two to three years following a national
championship in football or basketball.117 Unlike financial investments,
where shareholders have the ability to disconnect themselves with a company
by selling stock and have every incentive to maximize value now, students and
other stakeholders of an academic institution often make a lifelong financial

113. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)).
114. Id. § 953.
115. See Mike Fish, Most Powerful Boosters, ESPN (Jan. 12, 2006), http://sports.espn.go.com/
ncf/news/story?id=2285986; Darren Rovell, The High Price of Supply and Demand, ESPN (Jan. 13,
2006), http://proxy.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=2286027.
116. Drew Kann, Athletics Can Help Lessen Budget Cuts, RED AND BLACK (Mar. 4, 2010),
http://redandblack.com/2010/03/04/athletics-can-help-lessen-budget-cuts/ (noting that the University
of Georgia athletic department, and others around the country, donate millions of dollars to their
institution’s academic programs each year).
117. Steven R. Cox & Dianne M. Roden, Quality Perception and the Championship Effect: Do
Collegiate Sports Influence Academic Rankings?, 6 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC. J. 1, 4 (2010) (finding that
“the average college ranking . . . for the two years after winning a national championship in football
or basketball is significantly improved compared to the two years before. Consistent with increased
applications, acceptance rates are lower and SAT scores are higher.”).
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and emotional commitment to that institution. Thus, students and boosters
alike have a long-term incentive in maintaining the academic and athletic
prestige of their institution. As important as it is to win now, most college
students also understand the role athletics plays in helping maintain the value
of their degree.
Second, section 954 provides a bigger stick for enforcement by the
NCAA. As discussed previously, major violations of NCAA rules and the
issuance of major probations have been widespread in recent years.118
However, instead of placing the brunt of the penalty where it belongs—on the
supervising “executives”—the NCAA too often punishes players, coaches, and
students who had less to do with the violation than the “executives.”119 The
Dodd-Frank Act succeeds in assigning blame where it belongs and requiring
repayment of fraudulently obtained compensation.120
The actions that result in probation or major punishment in the NCAA
usually arise at two levels within the organization, the coaching level and the
player level. Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act, requiring repayment of
compensation to the institution, is most applicable at the coaching level. The
NCAA is prone to leveling two different kinds of penalties on coaches: a
“show-cause”121 penalty that makes it difficult for the coach committing the
violation to work at another institution in the NCAA and a probational penalty
against the school and its athletic department.122 The NCAA, however, does
not require repayment of salary or benefits by the coach to the institution, and
probational penalties often hurt the student-athletes and students more so than
the coach who caused the probation to be levied.123 Coaches can leave a
probation-stricken program to coach at another institution if there is not a
show cause penalty attached to the probation, or they can leave to coach in
professional sports.124 By adopting a compensation provision inspired by
118. See generally Arizona St. Postseason Ban Upheld, supra note 67; NCAA Puts Radford on
2-Year Probation, supra note 67; Boise State Cited for Major Violations, supra note 67; Bruce Pearl
Told Recruits of Violation, supra note 67; NCAA Accepts Baylor’s Penalties, supra note 67.
119. Weston, supra note 8, at 564–66.
120. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (codified
as amended in 15 U.S.C. §78j-4 (2012)).
121. NCAA BYLAWS § 19.5.2(k) (2011–12) (requiring “that an institution that has been found
in violation . . . of the provisions of NCAA legislation while representing another institution, show
cause why a penalty or additional penalty should not be imposed, if, in the opinion of the Committee
on Infractions, the institution has not taken appropriate disciplinary or corrective action against
athletics department personnel involved in the infractions case or any other institutional employee, if
the circumstances warrant, or a representative of the institution’s athletics interests”).
122. Id. § 19.5.2(b).
123. Weston, supra note 8, at 565–68.
124. See, e.g., Associated Press, Colts Hire Jim Tressel as Consultant, ESPN (Sept. 2, 2011),
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Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the NCAA can eliminate the ability for
coaches who incur probational penalties for their schools to escape without
consequence. The regulation should be similar to the Dodd-Frank Act
provision and require an assessment of income generated by the coach, both in
the season prior to the probation being levied and in the season after the
probation is levied. For example, a team like University of Southern
California (USC), which Pete Carroll left amidst a slew of probational
penalties, was forced to forgo a lucrative BCS bowl for two seasons as a result
of penalties incurred under Pete Carroll’s watch.125 USC could have made
millions of dollars simply by participating in the bowl.126 The proposed
regulation would account for that loss, among other measurable losses as a
direct result of probation, and determine the percentage decrease in football
revenue as a result of the probation. If the percentage decrease is, for
example, 20%, then the coach responsible for the probation should be forced
to return 20% of his salary for the year(s) in which the probation occurred for
as long as the decrease in revenue continues. So, in the case of a coach
directly committing violations that result in the “death penalty”127 for the
program, the forfeited compensation would equal 100% of the coach’s salary.
By implementing such a scheme, the NCAA could solve one of the major
sources of violations that lead to probation.
The second major source of probational violations is player misconduct.128
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/6922766/indianapolis-colts-hire-jim-tressel-replay-review-consultant
(noting how Jim Tressel, after leaving Ohio State as a result of numerous NCAA violations and a
subsequent cover up, obtained a job with the NFL’s Indianapolis Colts as a replay consultant);
Seahawks Introduce New Coach Carroll, ESPN (Jan. 13, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/
story?id=4819493 (noting how Pete Carroll left USC in the wake of NCAA violations to pursue a
career in the NFL where he would not be subject to whatever sanctions the NCAA placed on USC).
125. See NCAA Delivers Postseason Football Ban, ESPN (June 11, 2010), http://sports.espn.
go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5272615.
126. See Chris Greenberg & Chris Spurlock, Bowl Game Payouts Map: Money Earned in
2011–2012 BCS and Other Football Bowls, THE HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/12/29/bowl-game-payouts-map-2011-2012-bcs_n_1174808.html (last updated Aug. 7, 2012).
127.
Associated Press, NCAA Prez: Death Penalty an Option, ESPN (Aug. 19, 2011),
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/6877907/ncaa-president-mark-emmert-says-deathpenalty-option-punish-rule-breakers. The death penalty is a potential enforcement mechanism for the
NCAA. When a school has had two major infractions during a five-year period, the NCAA can issue
the “death penalty” for the sport that incurred the infractions. Id. The death penalty prevents the
school from participating in the sport for one year. Id.
128. See, e.g., Pete Thamel, Hurricane Players and Recruits Accused of NCAA Violations,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011, at B14 (discussing former Miami booster Nevin Shapiro and his role in
distributing thousands of dollars to Miami players and providing yachts and adult entertainment to
players and recruits at his home); Lynn Zinser, U.S.C. Sports Receive Harsh Penalties from NCAA,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, at B9 (discussing the improper benefits that basketball star O.J. Mayo and
football star Reggie Bush accepted during their time at USC); Stewart Mandel, Tressel on Borrowed
Time at Ohio State in Wake of NCAA Allegations, SI.COM, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/
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The NCAA struggles in governing player misconduct in much of the same
way that it struggles governing coaching misconduct. Players, like coaches,
who commit violations or are suspended from their current school can transfer
to a lower division school and play immediately, or if they meet the
professional eligibility requirements of their respective league, they can leave
school. The student-athletes, like the coaches, are currently in a one-time
reputational game where the risk of cheating is often worth the reward, not
because the reward is so great, but because the consequences are so minor. In
order to solve this asymmetry, there are two possible solutions. The first,
paying student-athletes, has been widely debated and criticized, and is one this
Article will not explore.129 Since players are not paid, the compensation
clawbacks discussed above are not a viable alternative.
The third proposed reform, and second potential solution to solving the
reputational game athletes play, is a partnership between the NCAA and the
(NFL) and National Basketball Association (NBA). The partnership can serve
as an analog to coach’s compensation clawbacks. This structure has begun to
develop already, as both the NFL and NBA have implemented policies
requiring collegiate athletes to spend a specified number of years removed
from high school in order to be eligible for the professional draft.130 The
requirement has had a widespread effect on players leaving college early for
the draft, or not attending college at all, but has done little to curb violations
amongst amateur players. The NCAA should continue its relationship with
the NBA and NFL and view the professional leagues as government regulators
that will impose penalties on players who commit infractions at the college
level. By doing so, the NCAA will eliminate the one-time reputational game
many players play during their college tenure and will force players and
coaches to become repeat players in the broader game of sports, rather than
one-time players under the NCAA’s watch.
A player, for example, who commits a violation in his senior year, is
forced to sit out at the Division I level or play at a community college or
Division II level, and then enters the professional draft has no real incentive to

writers/stewart_mandel/04/25/ohio-state-tressel-ncaa/index.html (last updated Apr. 26, 2011)
(discussing the player misconduct and subsequent cover up that eventually cost Jim Tressel his job).
129. See, e.g., Doug Bandow, End College Sports Indentured Servitude: Pay “Student
Athletes”, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2012/02/21/endcollege-sports-indentured-servitude-pay-student-athletes/; Ben Cohen, The Case for Paying College
Athletes: The Issue is Gaining Momentum, but Nobody Knows How to Do It, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16,
2011, at D10.
130. See NCAA BYLAWS § 12.2.4.2 (2011–12); see also John Infante, Draft Rules Fail Basics
of Amateurism, NCAA (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/blog/2011/02/draft-rules-fail-basics-ofamateurism/.
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behave properly in college. The end game result is still the same for a player
who turns professional. In order to effectively deter student-athletes from
committing violations, the NCAA needs to enforce carryover penalties that
follow the athletes into their professional careers.
C. Consistency, Comparability, and Transparency in Recruiting and PostEnrollment Benefits
Financial markets struggle to create common knowledge because of the
delicate balance between disclosing enough information to avert a disastrous
collapse and keeping confidential enough information to ensure an institution
retains its proprietary advantage in the marketplace.131 Too much common
knowledge stifles innovation and eliminates some competitive advantages,
while too little common knowledge “perpetuates risky behavior beyond an
efficient threshold.”132 Often times, the longer the market goes without
creating common knowledge, the higher the profits and the harder the
collapse.133 The lack of common knowledge prevents a bubble from
bursting.134
A major portion of the Dodd-Frank Act is meant to create transparency
and accountability, and in turn common knowledge, for exotic instruments
such as asset-backed securities, hedge funds, MBSs, and payday lenders.135 It
is well discussed that the depth and breadth of asymmetric information
regarding the abovementioned exotic instruments contributed greatly to the
financial crisis.136 Issuers, purchases, and unsophisticated consumers allowed
the cash flows from these exotic instruments to dictate their price and demand
without conducting much, if any, due diligence into the underlying assets.137
By the time the credit markets froze, these exotic instruments were so far

131. Gary B. Gorton, The Subprime Panic 26–27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper
14398, 2008).
132. Rudderman, supra note 15, at 68.
133. Id.
134. See Robert J. Aumann, Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality, 8
Games & Econ. Behav. 6, 6 (1995) (arguing “that if common knowledge of rationality obtains in a
game of perfect information, then the backward induction outcome is reached”).
135. See generally U.S. S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSE, & URBAN AFFAIRS, BRIEF SUMMARY
OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_s
ummary_Final.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
136. Michel G. Maila, Contributing Factors to the Emergence of Risk in Financial Markets
and Implications for Risk Governance, INT’L. RISK GOVERNANCE COUNCIL 1, 1–2 (Oct. 2010)
(noting that the prevalence of sophisticated financial products creates a large information gap).
137. Rudderman, supra note 15, at 57–58.
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removed from their original source or issuer that institutions and counter
parties were unable to determine how risky their investments actually were.138
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act charges the CFTC and the SEC with
consulting each other and the prudential regulators to ensure that any
rulemaking or orders regarding the abovementioned exotic instruments are
coordinated to assure “consistency and comparability.”139 The title also
requires that the CFTC and SEC address one of the main regulatory problems
in any scheme, regulating function over form.140 The title also gives the
FSOC ultimate discretion over resolving disputes between the CFTC and SEC
and addressing unaddressed regulatory issues.141 The regulatory scheme gives
broad discretionary authority to the CFTC, SEC and ultimately, FSOC to (1)
use their regulatory and investigatory power to create common knowledge and
develop transparency and accountability and (2) to regulate function over form
in securities and swaps markets.142
Businesses, financial markets, and even the NCAA are like fragile
ecosystems.143 When a market, or ecosystem, consists of similar individual
pieces, “one shared weakness can spell disaster for the whole lot. Even when
a new beneficial trait or tool enters the picture, if all organisms adopt it . . . a
tenuous balance can be quickly upset . . . .”144 “Like the spread of an
infectious disease, financial troubles can be launched by so-called ‘superspreaders,’” or what we would deem “too big to fail” institutions.145 The
financial markets saw the introduction of a new, foreign, but beneficial
product, quickly adopted it in mass numbers, and then, because of the
homogeneity of the market, collapsed after a minor blip on the radar.
One can think of the NCAA as an ecosystem with agents, boosters, and
incredible sums of money as foreign, but perhaps beneficial objects, and
138. Id. (noting that the costs of conducting due diligence far outweigh the risks for a repeat
player. The cycle also increases the adverse selection problem as counter parties know that the
institution holding the asset does not know exactly what it is, and moral hazard is exacerbated as the
exotic instruments are passed so quickly that no one party has any incentive to conduct adequate due
diligence.).
139. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 712(a)(1)–(2), 124 Stat.1376, 1641–42 (2010)
(codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. 8302 (2012)).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 712(a)(7)(A).
142. Id. § 712(a)(7)(A)–(B).
143. See Katherine Harmon, Can Ecological Models Explain Global Financial Markets—and
Make Them More Stable?, SCI. AM. (Jan. 19, 2011), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/
2011/01/19/can-ecological-models-explain-global-financial-markets-and-make-them-more-stable/.
144. Id. (quoting Andrew G. Haldane & Robert M. May, Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems,
NATURE, Jan. 20, 2011, at 351.)
145. Id.
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understand how the NCAA is following the same path as the financial
markets. As each member institution pays its coaches and directors more
money,146 as boosters become increasingly influential in the day-to-day
operations of athletic institutions,147 and as agents insert their professional
advice into amateur athletics,148 the risk of de-amateurization and the end of
the NCAA in its current form increases. In order to curb the “ecosystem”
effect, the NCAA should adopt modified versions of the abovementioned
Dodd-Frank Act provisions to increase accountability and transparency and to
ensure consistency in enforcement and regulation. One can view the CFTC
and SEC as individual NCAA member institutions and conferences and the
overall governing body of the NCAA as the prudential regulators with ultimate
authority. The current NCAA compliance scheme consists of a series of exante regulations149 controlling actions of member institutions but requires little
in the way of proactive reporting requirements.150 The NCAA manual simply
states that it is the responsibility of the institution to “monitor its programs to
assure compliance and to identify and report to the Association instances in
which compliance has not been achieved. In any such instance, the institution
shall cooperate fully with the Association and shall take appropriate corrective
actions.”151 The regime also consists of a series of guidelines dictating the
process for ex-post investigations of potential violations by NCAA
investigation committees.152 This is much the same structure that the financial
industry maintained prior to 2008.153 Instead, the NCAA’s modified versions
of sections 712 and 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act should force internal
compliance officers of member institutions and conferences to discuss
recruiting, agent interaction, and booster interaction with the ultimate

146. See Coaches’ Pay Soars Again, supra note 109; You Have to Pay to Play in March, supra
note 109; Upton & Berkowitz, supra note 109.
147. Michael Rosenberg, Nike’s Phil Knight has Branded Oregon into National Power, SI.COM
(Jan. 7, 2011) http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/michael_rosenberg/01/06/oregon.knight/
index.html (describing Phil Knight’s access and influence over the Oregon athletic program). Phil
Knight has his own headset in his suite on game day at Oregon’s stadium so he can listen to the
dialogue between coaches during the game. Id.
148. Michael A. Corgan, Comment, Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept Endorsement Deals:
A Solution to the Financial Corruption of College Athletics Created by Unethical Sports Agents and
the NCAA’s Revenue Generating Scheme, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 371, 396–400 (2012).
149. See generally NCAA BYLAWS (2011–12). The compliance rules are almost entirely of exante prohibitions, rather than constructive compliance and reporting mechanisms.
150. See id. § 2.8.1.
151. Id.
152. Id. §§ 32.1–32.11.
153. See Kwak, supra note 39. A series of self-reporting regulations and ex-post investigations
does little to prevent a systemic crisis.
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governing body, the NCAA (or, per the analogy, the prudential regulators).154
Such a requirement would help solve the common knowledge problem. The
NCAA would effectively become the prudential regulator to the ecosystem. If
there are ex-ante reporting requirements, not just prohibitions, the NCAA as
prudential regulators can identify trends towards homogeneity in the form of
rules violations, which pose a systemic risk to the NCAA. Because the risks
will be identified by an independent agent (the NCAA instead of each
individual institution), the regime also solves the collective action problem
whereby member institutions continue behaving in a way that maximizes their
profits but exposes their entire system to systemic risk.
As noted above, the current dialog between the NCAA and its member
institutions occurs largely after a member institution discovers a violation
because the NCAA manual demands self-reporting of violations.155 The clear
problem with this self-reporting mechanism, however, is that the violation has
already occurred. A constant dialogue between the NCAA and its member
institutions regarding recruiting visits from prospective players, booster
interaction, and any questionably permissible benefits given to student-athletes
would allow the NCAA to address potential violations by processing the
information it receives before the violation occurs. In turn, the NCAA can
work with the member institution to act in a swift, preventative manner to
either avoid the impermissible conduct or to take mitigating action to limit
potential penalties.
Critics will argue that the market should dictate the level of amateurism in
the NCAA,156 and if players are able to command pay from the boosters,
coaches, or agents that recruit them, the NCAA should not treat it as a
violation, nor implement a new scheme to try to remedy the issue, nor even be
concerned about any violation that is not illegal outside of the context of the
NCAA.157 Rather, critics argue, the NCAA should allow college sports to turn
into pure business.158 As discussed above, however, complete deregulation
and a lack of monitoring of the NCAA would effectively eliminate athletic

154. Many NCAA violations arise as a result of impermissible benefits provided to studentathletes by boosters or agents. Others arise as coaches violate contact and communication rules with
recruits as they try to attract the best talent possible to their programs.
155. NCAA BYLAWS § 2.8.1–2.8.3.
156. Andy Schwarz, Excuses, Not Reasons: 13 Myths about (Not) Paying College Athletes,
SELECTED PROC. SANTA CLARA SPORTS L. SYMP. 46, 47 (Sept. 2011).
157. See Bartz & Sloey, supra note 13, at 2.
158. Id. Note, however, that a pure business is not viable in any sports league. Even the NBA
and NFL have salary caps and anti-tampering rules that promote some kind of order and preserve the
leagues product. Id. at 6.
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programs at all but the most profitable institutions.159 Schools with large,
profitable athletic programs would no longer agree to revenue sharing plans
because the assets they share with smaller institutions can now be used in an
attempt to recruit the most sought after players.160 As a result, non-revenue
generating sports and many women’s sports would be eliminated from
member institutions.161 The end result of not policing NCAA violations
would be an elimination of all but the very best football and basketball
programs.162
In order to effectively implement the above regime and prevent the deamateurization of college sports, however, the NCAA also needs to reform its
idea of compliance coordinators at member institutions. Currently, most
NCAA compliance directors and assistant directors hold degrees in Sports
Management or a related business field.163 Many compliance directors are not
practicing lawyers.164 However, a “compliance director in a major program is
an educator, arbitrator, mediator, advocate, enforcer, and not infrequently, the
fall-guy.”165 Why, then, are compliance directors not required to be educated
as such? A compliance director’s main contribution to his or her employer is
developing a system for investigating and reporting NCAA infractions.166 In
order to adequately do so, however, the compliance director needs to have
read, interpreted, and understood the 439-page NCAA rulebook. The rulebook
reads much like a state or federal law, and as one Texas basketball coach
noted, “You’ve got to be a lawyer at the top of your class [to understand the
NCAA rules].”167 Putting the right people in the right places (simply
executing on a fundamental business principle) will help ensure that the
NCAA creates meaningful, bottom-up reform in its corporate governance.

159. See id. at 24.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 26–29.
162. Id. at 29.
163. Megan Fuller, Note, Where’s the Penalty Flag: The Unauthorized Practice of Law, the
NCAA, and Athletic Compliance Directors, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 495, 516 (2009–2010).
164. See id.
165. Gene Marsh & Marie Robbins, Weighing the Interests of the Institution, the Membership
and Institutional Representatives in an NCAA Investigation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 667, 695 (2003) (noting
that “[g]iven the infusion of millions of dollars into major college athletics, the resultant pressure to
win and the never-ending quest of purportedly well-meaning individuals to get into the inner circle of
the department, a compliance director has the most difficult job in college athletics”).
166. Id. at 697.
167. Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics: Time for a New Game
Plan, 46 ALA. L. REV. 487, 509 (1995).
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D. How More Independent Directors on the NCAA’s Infractions Committee
Will Lead to More Consistent, Workable Results
Section 932(t) of the Dodd-Frank Act mandates that nationally recognized
statistical rating agencies have a board of directors. The board shall consist of
at least two members, and at least half of those members shall be independent
from the rating agency.168 The act specifically defines that in order to be
considered independent, the director may not, other than in his or her capacity
as director, “accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from
the nationally recognized statistical rating organization; or be a person
associated with the nationally recognized statistical rating organization or with
any affiliated company thereof . . . .”169 Where a director violates one of the
above requirements, he or she will be “disqualified from any deliberation
involving a specific rating in which the independent board member has a
financial interest in the outcome of the rating.”170 Furthermore, compensation
for the board of directors must not be “linked to the business performance of
the nationally recognized statistical rating organization, and shall be arranged
so as to ensure the independence of their judgment.”171
The goal in forcing credit agencies to contain independent directors is to
remove any bias in decisions made by the rating agency that would result in
financial gain to the directors, oftentimes at the expense of the investing
public. The NCAA can be viewed in the same light. The passion involved in
college athletics is unmatched elsewhere in sports, and the pressures for a nonindependent board member of the NCAA Committee on Infractions to levy
penalties on a competitor, especially a rival, of his or her institution can be
immense. As one former NCAA infractions committee member noted, “For
many people, happiness is the news that an NCAA enforcement representative
is visiting another campus, most especially a competitor.”172
The current rules governing the composition of the NCAA Committee on
Infractions are as follows. The committee is composed of ten members, seven
of whom, curiously, “shall be at present or previously on the staff of an active
member institution or member conference of the Association,” and at least two
but no more than three of whom shall be members of the general public not
affiliated with the association, its members, or representatives.173
168. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932(t)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1882 (2010)
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2012)).
169. Id. § 932(t)(2)(B)(i).
170. Id. § 932(t)(2)(B)(ii).
171. Id. § 932(t)(2)(C).
172. Marsh & Robbins, supra note 165, at 682.
173. NCAA BYLAWS § 19.1.1 (2011–12) (emphasis added).
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Additionally, there are two members elected as “coordinators of appeals.”174
These members are responsible for processing appeals, being present at
hearings (although they cannot actively participate in the hearings), being
present and participating at committee deliberations, and representing the
committee in the event a decision of the committee is appealed.175 Each
member of the Committee on Infractions serves a three-year term and may be
reelected two times.176 The purpose of the two coordinators of appeals is “to
establish a separation between those who make the decision at the ‘trial court’
level, and those who defend the decision on appeal” from the member
institution.177 Since two members must be designated coordinators of appeals,
eight others are voting members, with as many as three and as few as two
being public members.178 The current NCAA Committee on Infractions has
three public members, all three of whom are attorneys, and seven non-public
members.179
As in the financial sector, there is a serious need to increase the number of
independent members on the infractions committee. This Article proposes that
the NCAA follow Dodd-Frank’s footsteps and mandate that half of the ten
members on the committee be independent members and four of them be
voting members. There is obvious value to having both non-public and public
members on the infractions committee. For related members, they likely have
a deep understanding of the NCAA, as they attend committee meetings and
conventions for a variety of NCAA issues and have daily, first-hand
knowledge of the workings of the NCAA and their own institution.180
However, those non-public members also, at the very least, are viewed as
being biased towards their own institution during infractions hearings and, at
most, act on that bias in favor of their own institution. 181 Clearly, committee

174. Id.
175. Id. § 19.1.1.4.
176. Id. § 19.1.1.3.
177. Gene A. Marsh, A Call for Dissent and Further Independence in the NCAA Infractions
Process, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 695, 704 (2009).
178. NCAA BYLAWS § 19.1.1.
179. See Committee on Infractions, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public
/NCAA/Enforcement/People/Committee+on+Infractions (last updated Oct. 25, 2011). The current
committee consists of one attorney from Polsinelli Shughart, Andres Kurth, and Foley & Lardner, and
seven non-public members, one from the Southeastern Conference, Conference USA, and MidEastern Athletic Conference, and one from Temple, Missouri, Oregon, and Notre Dame, respectively.
Id.
180. Marsh, supra note 172, at 705.
181. There is also a risk that these members have an axe to grind against the NCAA or a fellow
institution. The presence of multiple non-public members on the committee creates a collective
action problem and disincentivizes NCAA members from reporting violations of other schools.
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members hailing from certain institutions or conferences would not fall into
section 932’s definition of “independent.”182
By the same token, the ability to attract highly qualified lawyers and
judges as public committee members almost necessitates an increase in the
number of public members.183 One former committee member and law
professor noted:
The former and current public members who deliberate on
cases came to us with judicial experience, either in state or
federal court. What they bring to the process is years of
judicial experience, seasoned by all the experience such
service brings. At the same time, they are not card-carrying
members of the NCAA. It is the legal experience and the
independence that makes them so valuable in the process. . . .
Their questioning and skepticism—often bluntly stated—have
helped us to get to more just results along the way.184
Public members “bring to the process the same perspective, independence, and
integrity that outside directors bring to corporate governance.”185 With such
positive results and feedback for the role public members play on the
committee, it is curious that the NCAA has not employed the minimum
number of non-public members simply to adequately inform public members
of relevant NCAA workings. This would maintain a feeling of “credibility in
the eyes of individuals who are judged and penalized in the process”186 but
leave much of the actual decision making and voting processes to experienced,
disinterested lawyers and judges.
E. How Increased Whistleblower Protections and Incentives Can Lead to
Detection of More Violations and Less Severe Punishments for Those
Violations
The final recommendation of this Article to improve corporate governance
in the NCAA is to add to its rulebook whistleblower protections beyond those
already present in state and federal law. The 439-page NCAA rulebook makes
no mention of whistleblowers or protections for them. Sections 748 and 922
of the Dodd-Frank Act offer whistleblower protections and incentives in both

182. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932(t)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1882 (2010)
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2012)).
183. Marsh, supra note 172, at 707.
184. Id. at 707–08.
185. Id. at 707.
186. Id. at 709.
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a commodities setting and a securities setting.187 Both sections prohibit
employer retaliation against employees who:
(i) [P]rovide information to the SEC or the CFTC pursuant to
these new programs; (ii) initiate, testify, or assist in an
investigation or judicial or administrative action based on or
related to such information; or (iii) make disclosures that are
required or protected under [Sarbanes Oxley].188
The Act also provides substantial reward incentives for whistleblowers.189
The Act provides that the SEC shall pay an award to a whistleblower who
“voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that led to the
successful enforcement of the covered . . . action.”190 The amount of the
award will be between 10% and 30% of the total amount collected of the
monetary sanctions imposed on the violating party.191 In determining the
amount of the award, the SEC considers:
(I) [T]he significance of the information provided by the
whistleblower to the success of the covered judicial or
administrative action; (II) the degree of assistance provided by
the whistleblower and any legal representative of the
whistleblower in a covered judicial or administrative action;
[and] (III) the programmatic interest of the Commission in
deterring violations of the Act . . . by making awards to
whistleblowers who provide information that leads to the
successful enforcement of such laws . . . .192
Oftentimes, the first people to find out about a violation of NCAA rules
are those within the violating institution’s organization. The compliance
director and others within the member institution are often in the best position
to remedy or self-report a violation, although they seldom do so unless they
are reasonably certain that self-reporting violations will lead to a less harsh
penalty from the NCAA than if the violation is later discovered by the
NCAA’s own investigation. There are, however, two problems with
attempting to apply the whistleblower protections to the NCAA. First, the
unique, team-oriented nature of sports puts whistleblowers at risk of being cast
as outliers within their organization. Second, whistleblowers in NCAA
187. §§ 748, 922.
188. Daniel J. Venditti, Whistleblower Protections Under the Dodd-Frank Act, WEIL
EMPLOYER UPDATE 2 (Jan.–Feb. 2011).
189. Id. at 2–3.
190. § 748(b)(1).
191. § 748(b)(1)(A)–(B).
192. § 748(c)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(III).
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violations have much less to gain monetarily than their financial counterparts,
as many violations even deal with non-monetary items. In order to effectively
incentivize whistleblowers to come forward, the NCAA should assign dollar
values to the duration and types of common violations, such that potential
whistleblowers have some idea regarding the value of their tip should it lead to
punishment of their institution.
VI. CONCLUSION
The NCAA and its member institutions have experienced a meteoric rise
in revenue and visibility over the past decade. Accompanying that rise are
problems of the rich getting richer, large scale recruiting violations, and the
overall de-amateurization of college athletics. Much like the financial
industry, NCAA member institutions have sacrificed long-term gains in
exchange for short-term profits. The NCAA as a governing body, however,
has not adjusted its enforcement mechanisms accordingly. The abovediscussed regulations, as adopted from the Dodd-Frank Act, will help align
incentives between the NCAA and its member institutions, reduce the number
and severity of cheating incidents by players and coaches, and return the
NCAA to the healthy forum for amateur competition that it desires.

